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AT ISSUE

House Rules
Is a supermajority requirement for tax hikes constitutional?
In 1995, on the first day of the 104th Congress,
the House of Representatives amended House Rule
XXI, which governs the consideration of bills, to
require athree-fifths majority vote to pass any
increase inincome tax rates. Anyone who had doubts
about the new Republican majority's determination to
rein in taxes, the action seemed to say, need not have.
But voices were raised immediately, and critics
continue to decry the measure as unconstitutional.
Some contend that by restricting the rights of the
majority, such a requirement undercuts our entire
system of government. Others look to the text of the
Constitution and find no prohibition against adding a
new supermajority requirement (to those already

constitutionally mandated to impeach officials and
ratify treaties, for example).
John 0. McGinnis, a professor at Benjamin N.
Cardozo Law School of Yeshiva University in New
York City, and Michael B.Rappaport, a professor at
University of San Diego School of Law, have published articles on supermajority-rule constitutionality
and written about separation of powers. They argue
that the rule change passes constitutional muster.
Opposing them isSusan Low Bloch, a constitutional law professor at Georgetown University Law
Center who clerked with Justice Thurgood Marshall.
She says such a change represents a threat to the
balance of power among the branches of government.

Yes: Each chamber can adopt its own procedures
Although opponents of this threefifths rule have brought a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality, we believe
the rule is wholly constitutional.
The Constitution gives each house the
authority "to determine the rules of its proceedings." The three-fifths rule is a rule of
proceeding because it governs the internal
operations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, the House may enact the three-fifths
rule so long as it does not violate another
provision of the Constitution.
Opponents of the rule fail to identify
a constitutional clause that prohibits the
three-fifths rule. The Constitution does not
specify the proportion of legislators necessary to pass a bill. Rather, it simply states
that bills must "pass" each house.
The silence of the Constitution on the
type of majority required to pass a bill is
not the result of inattention to the issue.
Instead it reflects the framers' intent to
permit the houses of the legislature to decide the question. When the Constitution
actually mandates a legislative majority,
as it does for quorums, or a supermajority, as it does
for treaties, it does so explicitly.
Other venerable rules, such as the filibuster and
the committee system, support the constitutionality of
this rule. Like the three-fifths rule, these rules temper
the power of legislative majorities in order to advance
other values such as legislative deliberation. If the filibuster and the committee system are constitutional,
so is the three-fifths rule.
Opponents of the three-fifths rule often charge
that it is antidemocratic, but the rule is entirely con78 ABA JOURNAL / MARCH 1997

sistent with majority control. A majority of
the House of Representatives voted for the
rule, and a majority can waive or repeal it
at any time. A legislative rule that could not
be repealed by a majority would be unconstitutional because it would function like a
constitutional amendment. But the threefifths rule does not suffer from this defect.
Another argument that has been
raised against the three-fifths rule is that
it somehow aggrandizes the role of the
House of Representatives in the legislative
process. The three-fifths rule, however,
completely conforms to the constitutional
separation of powers.
First, it is even odd to describe the
three-fifths rule as expanding the authority
of the House; the rule limits the House's
power to pass bills. More fundamentally,
the Constitution gives each house the power
to refuse to pass legislation for virtually any
reason. Thus, the Senate cannot complain
if the House refuses to pass legislation the
Senate proposes. Similarly, the Senate may
not object to rules that make it harder for
the House to pass such legislation.
In addition to being constitutional, the three-fifths
rule is also good policy. For the last 50 years the republic has been beset by a difficult problem: Concentrated interest groups can successfully obtain benefits
for themselves and place the costs on a diffuse, legislatively ineffective popular majority.
The three-fifths rule should be celebrated as a
modest attempt to restore the power of popular majorities without taking the more radical step of amending the Constitution.
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Taxation Tally
Recent federal income tax rate increases and the votes by which they
passed the House of Representatives:
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Since the 63rd Congress (1912-1914)-the first with
435 members-17 Congresses have been ruled by a
three-fifths majority of either major party:
Election
Majority
Congress
year
Party members
102nd
1990
D
267
98th
1982
D
269
96th
1978
D
277
95th
1976
D
292
94th
1974
D
291
89th
1964
D
295
87th
1960
D
263
86th
1958
D
283
81st
1948
D
263
77th
1940
D
267
76th
1938
D
262
75th
1936
D
333
74th
1934
D
322
73rd
1932
D
313
71st
1928
R
267
67th
1920
R
300
63rd
1912
D
290

No: The framers had only a simple majority in mind
The supermajority requirement undermines the constitutional principles of Article I and separation of powers. Rule XXI is
not merely a rule of internal procedure; it
determines xxhen bills get presented to the
Senate and the president.
Article I, § 7 provides that "every Bill

There is no limit on the supermajority
rule. Thus, the House could require even
more than a 60 percent majority for selected topics or even for all legislation.
Even if most representatives and a majority of senators want a particular bill, the
bill could not get presented to the presiwhich shall have passed the House ...
and
dent and could never become law. If the
the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law.
House can do this, it has the power unilatbe presented to the President of the United
erally to enhance its power vis A vis the
States." The presumption is that '-passed"
BY SUS AN
Senate and the president.
IA(
means "ag-eed to by a majority of a quoLOW B OCH
Furthermore, if the House can adopt
rum." The question is whether either house
a rule like this, so can the Senate. Article I,
can change that meaning and insist that
§ 5 provides that "each House may deter"passed" requires more than a majority.
mine the Rules of its Proceedings." Thus, the Senate
While the Constitution does not explicitly deny ei- could say: "No judge
or cabinet official, once nominatther house the power to require a supermajority, that ed
by the President, shall be considered as confirmed
is true of many limits we infer from the structure of the
except by a three-fifths vote."
Constitution. Article 1, § 7 is a carefully crafted mechIf the Senate were allowed to adopt such a rule, it
anism that struck a balance between large and small would be able
singlehandedly to upset the carefully
states, the House and the Senate, and Congress and crafted rules
concerning appointment of both executive
the president. By adopting the three-fifths rule, the officials and judges,
and to unilaterally limit the power
House upsets this balance and unconstitutionally in- the Constitution
gives to the president in the appointtrudes on the powers of the Senate and the president.
ment process. The Senate would thus be able to agThe framers knew how to say they wanted a su- g-randize
its
permajority and, in fact, said so in several contexts. balance of own role and unconstitutionally distort the
powers established by the Constitution.
Proponents of the supermajority rule argue that the
Defenders of the rule say: "Don't worry; a simple
fr-amers may have meant this list to be simply the min- majority can repeal
the rule." But I see nothing in their
imal list of occasions that require supermajorities, and logic that stops
the House fi'om requiring that repeal of
that they intended to allow Congress to add to the list. the supermajority rule
itself requires a supermajority.
Considering the distorting impact that supermajorWhen a
of Cong-ess by its rules goes beity requirements can have on the other branches, I con- yond internal chamber
housekeeping and affects the relationship
clude that when the framers did not specify a superma- among the other
jority for bill passage, they not only presumed a majority its powers and institutional players, it aggrandizes
would be sufficient, they in fact intended not to allow ei- finely wrought unconstitutionally distorts the "single,
and exhaustively considered, procedure"
ther chamber to increase the number of votes required. carefully
crafted by the framers.
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